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This paper looks at the eﬀect of access to oﬀ-farm employment opportunities on
household exposure to unexpected shocks originating in the agricultural economy. Farm
households with improved access to both migrant and local labor markets are better able
to cope with shocks to agricultural production. The risk-coping beneﬁts of improved
access to oﬀ-farm markets are not shared evenly within or across villages. Wealthier
households show a more pronounced reduction in exposure to shocks, including less
variable income and consumption, and a reduced impact of production shocks on ex-
penditures related to the education of children.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Households in rural areas of developing countries often struggle with both poverty and
low incomes that vary sharply with shocks to agricultural production. Recent research in
economic development has looked at how well such households insure consumption in the
face of shocks (Townsend, 1994, 1995; Chaudhuri and Ravallion, 1997), and implications for
household resource allocation of ex ante risk-management behavior (Morduch, 1992, 1995).
Further research on the mechanisms used to reduce the impact of shocks has detailed the
importance of such ex post mechanisms as credit market transactions (Udry, 1994), depletion
of household savings (Paxson, 1992; Udry, 1995; Alderman, 1996), expanded participation
in oﬀ-farm activities (Kochar, 1999), and transfers from family members who have migrated
out of the community (Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989; Paulson, 1994).
For the most part, research on exposure to shocks and coping mechanisms has concen-
trated on the experience of relatively static rural economies.1 F o rt h o s er e g i o n so ft h e
developing world also undergoing economic transition, there are further important ques-
tions regarding the eﬀect of access to markets on both exposure to agricultural production
shocks, and on the salience of traditional mechanisms used to insure consumption. The
rural Chinese economy provides an interesting and dynamic environment for the study of
these issues.2 Over the last ﬁfteen years, some regions of rural China have witnessed ex-
traordinarily rapid, if uneven, growth of access to labor markets in both urban and rural
areas. The growth of these markets provides both a new source of income and a means of
reducing exposure to shocks aﬀecting agricultural production. At the same time, however,
it is likely that households diﬀer in the ease with which they shift labor between sectors
and, consequently, in their ability to beneﬁtf r o mt h e s eo ﬀ-farm labor markets.
This paper looks at the impact of oﬀ-farm labor markets on exposure to shocks aﬀecting
agricultural income. The gradual and uneven transition to greater labor market access
1An exeption is Jalan and Ravallion’s (1999) research using an earlier panel of data from rural China.
The data used in their research lacked the detailed community level data present in the RCRE dataset used
in this analyses, and also ended in 1990. For this reason, it predated the rapid expansion of markets for
migrant labor that ocurred between 1991 and 1997.
2This paper focuses on the exposure question, and another focuses on changes in risk-coping mechanisms.
2across rural China provides a unique quasi-natural experiment. By making use of a twelve-
year panel of village and household data, this paper shows that access to markets reduces
household exposure to unexpected shocks aﬀecting agricultural production. At the same
t i m e ,h o w e v e r ,t h er i s k - c o p i n gb e n e ﬁts provided by access to oﬀ-farm labor markets are
not shared evenly within or across communities. As villages become more connected to
wage labor markets, wealthier households show a more pronounced reduction in exposure
to shocks aﬀecting both income and consumption.
One important challenge faced by this paper is the likelihood that levels of participation
in oﬀ-farm labor markets are correlated with observed shocks to the local economy. Where
exogenous geographic variables recommend themselves as useful measures of physical close-
ness to markets, evidence from research on migration in China suggests that history of prior
migration from a village may be more important than geography in providing access to in-
formation about opportunities for oﬀ-farm employment (Meng, 1996; Rozelle et al, 1999).
Using variables from a separate village level survey and community information on rainfall,
this paper controls for possible endogeneity of decisions to participate in oﬀ-farm markets
and shows that access to these markets oﬀers a means of reducing income and consumption
variability.
In addition, the paper recognizes the likelihood that labor markets may function diﬀer-
ently depending on the ownership structures and employment practices of local enterprises.
If access to employment in collective enterprises requires favorable recommendation from
village leaders (Chen, 1997), employment in collectives may be rationed, thus making it
more diﬃcult to ﬁnd work in these enterprises subsequent to a shock. Private enterprises,
on the other hand, may hire fewer village residents for political purposes, but they will also
ﬁnd it easier to dismiss employees in the event of downturns aﬀecting the local economy.
Village surveys used in the analyses allow us to separately distinguish between changes in
access to collective and private employment, and changing opportunities for employment as
temporary migrants outside the village.
The paper ﬁrst oﬀers a brief discussion of the types of non-agricultural employment open
to rural households in Section 2. Section 3 builds on an approach introduced by Paxson
3(1992) that identiﬁes the eﬀect of rainfall shocks on income, and then uses measures of
market access to determine the impact of oﬀ-farm employment opportunities on exposure
to these shocks. Next, Section 4 shows that as villages become more connected to local
and distant markets for wage labor, households are better able to reduce the eﬀect of
rainfall shocks on consumption of non-durable goods. Of particular importance for the
accumulation of human capital, this section also provides evidence that expenditures related
to education of children are less responsive to agricultural production shocks as access to
local oﬀ-farm labor markets improves. A ﬁnal section concludes with a discussion of the
relevance of these ﬁndings for current policy discussions regarding the mobility of rural
l a b o ri nC h i n a .
2 Growth of Markets for Rural Labor
Economic reform in post-Mao China started with the decollectivization of agriculture after
1978. A one shot gain to eﬃciency was realized as decisions regarding management of
farm production were devolved to households under the Household Responsibility System
(HRS). Improved incentives for farm households led to the expansion of farm output and
incomes that occurred during the early and mid-1980s (Macmillan, Whalley and Zhu, 1989;
Lin 1992). After realization of gains from more eﬃcient farming in the 1980s, however,
institutional barriers to eﬃcient trade in factors of production continued to hinder the
eﬃcient utilization of resources in rural China. Obstacles to the transfer of land, the
continued rationing of credit, and restrictions on the movement of labor have all been held
responsible for the stagnation of incomes in some parts of rural China (Putterman, 1993).
During the 1990s, growth in markets for oﬀ-farm labor appears to have eased ineﬃciency
in labor allocation and facilitated renewed growth of rural incomes (Benjamin and Brandt,
1999). The twelve-year panel of household and village data used in this chapter captures
the heterogeneity in both the pace and forms of labor market growth, and lends itself to
an analysis of how dramatic changes in oﬀ-farm opportunities aﬀect the well-being of rural
farm households. Two features of this panel are quite striking. First, opportunities for
local oﬀ-farm employment remain unevenly distributed across this sample of villages, yet
4roughly half the villages show a signiﬁcant increase in the number of residents employed in
“private sector” jobs during the 1990s. Not surprisingly, those villages near large cities or
in the coastal province of Jiangsu show far greater levels of local oﬀ-farm employment than
more remote villages. Second, the panel picks up the rapid growth of China’s population
of rural migrants after 1991. In the 1990s, opportunities for migrant employment brought
the beneﬁts of oﬀ-farm employment to households in regions of China which had previously
been quite remote.
2.1 Components of Oﬀ-Farm Employment
The oﬀ-farm labor market is comprised of markets for local wage labor, markets for mi-
grant labor, and self-employed oﬀ-farm activities of households. Because these diﬀerent
components of the labor market have not developed at an even pace across diﬀerent regions
of rural China, the impact of the growth of each of these markets is considered separately.
The decision to participate in migrant or local oﬀ-farm labor markets depends on a range
of factors reﬂecting both the health of local economies, information ﬂows between villages
and distant labor markets, wage diﬀerentials, riskiness of employment, and household ability
and decision to participate in each type of market. In order to get a picture of the scale
of oﬀ-farm employment across the 44 villages under study, measures of access to oﬀ-farm
wage employment are ﬁrst constructed from village level survey data. In the community
survey, village leaders and accountants were asked how many legal residents were employed
a ts o m et i m ed u r i n gt h ey e a ri nl o c a le n t e r p r i s e so fav a r i e t yo fo w n e r s h i pt y p e s . I n
addition, they were also asked to estimate the number of legal residents employed in migrant
activities at diﬀerent distances from the village during the year. While these numbers are
necessarily rough estimates, they provide some measure of connection to diﬀerent labor
markets. Measures of access to each type of labor market are deﬁned as the share of legal
village residents estimated to be in each employment category: local collective enterprise
employment, local private enterprises, and migrant employment.3 Figures 1-3 present
3Ideally one might also wish to consider self-employment in non-agricultural activities as another category.
Before 1993, unemployed (or underemployed) labor appears to be confounded with self-employed activities
5summaries of the distributions of these measures over time.
Two signiﬁcant developments are picked up by the village level measures of labor market
access. First, Figure 1 captures the dramatic jump in migrant employment with the rapid
growth of China’s “ﬂoating population” after 1991. Various estimates place the size of
this migrant labor force at between 60 and 100 million rural laborers in 1995 — making this
one of the largest scale movements of labor in human history. Second, Figure 2 shows
the expansion of private wage employment opportunities during the 1990s,4 and Figure 3
shows milder increases in the share of labor with some collective enterprise employment.
2.2 Local Oﬀ-Farm Labor Markets
Before the loosening of the residential registration system in the early ‘90s, oﬀ-farm non-
agricultural labor markets were a localized phenomena that ﬁrst developed in pockets near
the coast or in the outskirts of large cities — regions that inherited the assets of Maoist
brigade enterprises and located in areas in which they had some chance of operating prof-
itably (Putterman, 1993). Access to these oﬀ-farm labor markets was thus rationed by the
geographic location of the household’s residential registration.
During the mid and late 1980s, these Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) became
one of the booming sectors of the Chinese economy and brought substantial increases in the
incomes of rural residents who could ﬁnd employment in them. Disparities in wealth grew
across regions as income growth lagged in localities where enterprises could not develop
proﬁtably (Rozelle and Jiang, 1994; Morduch and Sicular, 1996).
Research on the use of local labor markets to smooth shocks in rural India has shown that
households expand days of local employment to smooth shocks experienced on farm (Kochar,
1996). In some regions of China, the prospect that households can use local employment
to smooth shocks is limited by the dearth of local oﬀ-farm employment opportunities in
many areas. In addition, where oﬀ-farm local employment is concentrated in collective
enterprises, there is more likelihood that access to a job requires connections and may not
in the village level survey.
4Following the literature on rural enterprises, I consider private sector employment to include laborers
employed in both private ﬁrms and collectively-owned ﬁrms with assets contracted out to managers.
6be a convenient source of casual employment. Ability to expand local employment in the
face of shocks, then, may not be open to all households. In the villages of Jiangsu and
the Hefei suburbs (of Anhui), opportunities for employment in private enterprises are fairly
abundant by the mid-1990s. Increased access to wage jobs in private ﬁrms appears to be
more beneﬁcial for smoothing unexpected production shocks, suggesting that markets may
be better functioning in those areas with more private wage opportunities.
2.3 Migrant Labor Markets
As a result of institutional rigidities of the residential registration system, poor information
about jobs, and uncertainty over consequences of hiring migrants illegally, ﬂows of migrant
labor grew only slowly during the 1980s. As of the late ’80s, most rural migrants oper-
ated stalls selling vegetables in markets, worked as employees or owners of road-side small
restaurants, repair shops, or other informal sector activities in urban areas, or were engaged
in rural to rural migration facilitated through kinship ties (Mallee, 1996). Growing demand
for construction and service sector workers during the booming years of the ’90s, however,
fueled demand for laborers interested in jobs that were unattractive to urban workers. City
governments introduced work permits allowing migrants temporary employment in a range
of construction, service, and industrial job categories (Wang and Zuo, 1999). Contacts
between earlier migrants and rural communities then facilitated expansion of both formal
and informal ties between enterprises in destination communities and potential migrants in
source communities (Meng, 1996).
In the last few years, a signiﬁcant body of research conducted by both Western and
Chinese scholars has focussed on identifying the determinants of migration in China. In
studies focussing on characteristics of migrants and source communities, researchers have
alternatively attributed migration ability to level of education, household demographic com-
position, and level of household wealth.5 A recent six-province survey of village leaders
5Alternative and sometimes contradictory explanations of the determinants of migration can be found in
Solinger (1996), Mallee (1996), Yang and Zhou (1996), Meng (1996), Hare and Zhao (1996), and Parrish,
Zhe and Li (1995).
7suggests two aspects of migration in China consistent with rural to urban migration experi-
ences else where in the developing world — the poorest households are often not capable of
participating in migrant labor markets, and information ﬂows regarding opportunities are
most important in determining which villages will have high levels of out-migration (Rozelle
et al, 1998).
The temporary or “rotational” nature of China’s migrant labor force is also evident
both in Rozelle et al (1998) and in the RCRE panel used in this study. In common with
the experience of other developing countries, it is rare for entire households to migrate.
Instead, members of families will work outside the village as temporary migrants, and return
at diﬀerent times of the year to assist with the harvest or other economic activities of the
household. Explanations of this migration pattern point to both the diﬃculty of obtaining
permanent legal residence in urban areas (Yang, 1997), and the unclear property rights over
the land allocated to the family in the village (Benjamin and Brandt, 1999). If an entire
family leaves a village for a long period of time, it may well ﬁnd its land reallocated to other
households in the village. Given that access to land in rural China plays an important role
as a safety net guaranteeing households a means of earning an income, few households are
willing to forfeit this source of security unless their oﬀ-farm employment can be viewed as
permanent.6
For most households in villages of the RCRE survey, then, migrant wage employment
oﬀers one of many potential income earning activities to diversiﬁed households.7 Empirical
research using survey data from other regions of the developing world has detailed the risk-
coping beneﬁts of migrant employment opportunities (Paulson, 1996). Given the rapid
growth in the volume of trans-regional migrants in China, it is somewhat surprising that no
signiﬁcant research has analyzed the impact of migration on risk-coping behavior in source
villages. The twelve-year panel of data used in this study oﬀers a unique chance to study
6Another paper using the same sample from the RCRE dataset shows that the oﬀ-farm migration decision
is aﬀected by behavioral responses to risk, realized shocks, and the strength of control rights over land (Giles,
2000).
7For the poorest wealth tercile of households in the RCRE dataset, increased access to migrant opportu-
nity clearly contributes to the growth of household income per laborer (see the results in Table 4).
8the impact of rotational migration on both the exposure and risk-coping ability of migrant
and non-migrant households.
Greater village levels of participation in migrant labor markets could have positive or
negative eﬀects on households without migrant employment. If, as suggested by Townsend
(1994), households in a closed village economy oﬀer each other informal insurance against
shocks to income, then opening to labor markets outside the village could have a positive or
negative impact on the scope for “insurance contracts” between households. To the extent
that migrant income is uncorrelated with income earned locally, an increase in income earned
outside the village may expand the scope for mutually beneﬁcial co-insurance arrangements
between households. At the same time, however, models of mutual insurance typically
assume that households have close to perfect information about the shocks they each expe-
rience, their income realizations, and the level of eﬀort each household puts into earning its
income (Ravallion and Coate, 1993). As households start earning more income outside of
villages, the information requirements necessary for mutual insurance to work become less
plausible over time. In addition, households with higher savings from oﬀ-farm employment
may ﬁnd it more eﬃcient to self-insure rather than rely on uncertain insurance from other
members of the village. For these reasons, it is conceivable that households with migrants
will be less inclined to enter into informal insurance arrangements with other households
in the village, and as a result, expanded village connection to oﬀ-farm labor markets will
oﬀer few risk-coping beneﬁts to non-participating households. The analyses of Section 4
suggest that increased village access to migrant employment facilitates the consumption
smoothing. This beneﬁt is stronger and most signiﬁcant for households in the high and
middle wealth terciles, though this is not surprising because less aﬄuent households appear
to leave themselves less exposed to potential swings in income. Poorer households beneﬁt
more in terms of higher incomes (Table 4) with increased migrant opportunities, but they
do not appear to use the wider market as a means of reducing the idiosyncratic eﬀects of
weather shocks.
93 Household Income Variability and Oﬀ-Farm Employment
Opportunities
Recent research in the empirical development literature suggests that, in addition to higher
earnings, oﬀ-farm employment beneﬁts households by providing a source of income uncor-
related with income from on-farm agricultural production (Kochar, 1999; Paulson, 1996).
If either migrant or local oﬀ-farm employment provides rural Chinese households a way
of smoothing shocks to agricultural production, then households with improved access to
oﬀ-farm employment should have less variable income. The analyses below ﬁrst introduces
the RCRE dataset and then shows the importance of labor market access for the growth of
household incomes. The next section then discusses the empirical model used to identify
the eﬀect of increased market access on the variability of incomes. A third section discusses
results.
3.1 The RCRE Dataset
The analyses of household incomes and consumption presented in the paper use village and
household survey data provided by the Survey Department of the Research Centre on the
Rural Economy (RCRE) at the Ministry of Agriculture in Beijing. Annual village surveys
from 44 villages of Shanxi, Jiangsu, Anhui and Henan Provinces are used in conjunction
with a panel of data spanning the period 1986 to 1997 from roughly 3100 households.8
Economic data collected from village accountants and aggregated at the village level includes
information on village ﬁnances, crops grown by households in the village, allocation of land,
8RCRE has collected data from a panel of households since 1986, the survey was not conducted in 1992
a n d1 9 9 4d u et of u n d i n gd i ﬃculties. Households are asked a range of questions regarding income from on-
farm activities and oﬀ-farm employment, household consumption, land use, asset ownership, savings, formal
and informal access to and provision of credit, and transfers from both village members and friends and
family outside the village. Values of non-marketed grain that show up in income, consumption and grain
balance sections of the survey are adjusted to reﬂect market prices following a procedure outlined in Chen
and Ravallion (1996). The household survey is monitored by county agricultural research oﬃces that collect
expenditure, income and labor allocation information from households on a monthly basis. A staﬀ person
from the oﬃce works with households to clear up inconsistencies in the survey.
10and employment of village labor in enterprises of a range of management and ownership
types. Tables 1 and 2 brieﬂy summarize basic information on the surveyed villages and
households.
In addition to the RCRE data, enumerators collected twenty years of monthly rainfall
data from weather stations near each village in order to characterize purely exogenous
shocks to the local agricultural economy. An eight-month rainfall shock was calculated as
the diﬀerence between realized and expected rainfall.9 (A detailed discussion of the rainfall
shock calculation is provided in an Appendix.) Table 4 presents results of a regression
showing the impact of rainfall shocks on changes in household income per laborer. For
these villages in this region of China, positive shocks to rainfall are correlated with shortfalls
in income.10
Household Demographics and Land Endowment
The household demographic variables used include the numbers of prime age male and
female laborers legally registered as living in the household and the number of dependents
who are legal residents (all are subcategories of noncun changzhu renkou). Changes in
n u m b e r so fl a b o r e r so rd e p e n d e n t sr e ﬂect legal changes in the household due to birth,
death, marriage out of the household, splitting of the family, or legal transfer of residence.
Changing legal residence is usually a long-term bureaucratic process, and not something that
households are likely to engage in subsequent to a short-term shock. These variables include
long-term temporary migrants out of the village as current members of the household. For
these reasons, the household demographic variables reﬂect the family members belonging
to the household over the long-term, and do not vary in response to shocks aﬀecting the
9In calculating expected rainfall before a planting the current season’s crops, it was assumed that farmers
may recognize a dry year or a wet year by the start of the season. The expected rainfall for the period
between March and October is calculated using twenty years of monthly rainfall data. It allows for the
possibility that households recognize a dry year by March, and for correlation of rainfall accross years.
10Research in using rainfall data in Thailand (Paxson, 1992) and India (Jacobi and Skouﬁas, 1997), have
found that shocks to rainfall in these areas are positively related with shocks to income. The villages of
this study all have fairly well-developed irrigation systems. In this environment positive rainfall shocks are
problematic.
11household or village.
Measures of Human Capital
Individual level information regarding years of schooling for each laborer is not available
for the household, but the survey did record the numbers of household laborers with each
of four levels of educational attainment: illiterate, elementary education, lower middle
school education and upper middle school education. To these categories, a question was
also asked regarding the number of household members with a “special skill.” Shares of
long-term family members who have attaining each education level, and with “special skill”
are used to capture the human capital endowment of the household. Summaries of these
variables for households of diﬀerent wealth terciles are shown in Table 3.
12Household Earned Income Per Laborer
The household income variable shown in Tables 1 and 2 is the earned income per legal
prime age laborer. This measure includes the value of net proﬁts from household managed
activities (including any private, non-agricultural enterprise operated by the household),
wage income earned from employment in local enterprises, and net income brought back
to the household by temporary migrants employed outside the home village for part of the
year. The value on non-marketed grain produced by the household is valued at local market
prices. All unearned net transfers, including the value of gifts to or from friends and family,
are left out of this measure.
Household Wealth
In the analyses of incomes in this section and consumption in the next, the sample is
split into terciles based on the lagged value of household wealth per capita. Household
wealth is the sum of the value of household dwellings, production assets (including drought
animals, farm implements, machinery and motorized vehicles), household bank savings,
cash on hand and the net value of loans to individuals outside the household. Inclusion
of net loans assumes that households could call for repayment or assistance if they were in
trouble, and so these loans have value as an investment. One may also argue that only
liquid wealth should be considered because only this wealth is potentially important for
smoothing shocks. The results of the analyses were unchanged when the value of housing
stock and illiquid production assets were left out of the wealth calculation.
Determinants of Income
In order to ﬁrst get a sense of how well these demographic, human capital and market
access variables reﬂect the likely income earned by the household, Table 4 presents results
of regressions showing the relationship between income growth, increased access to oﬀ-farm
opportunities, and rainfall shocks. Diﬀerences in the log of household income per laborer
i sr e g r e s s e do nt h ed i ﬀerences in household demographic, land and human capital proﬁles,
and time-varying village measures of access to oﬀ-farm labor markets, and diﬀerences in
13rainfall shocks. Village dummy variables and province·year dummy variables are included
to control for village ﬁxed eﬀects and growth of the provincial macroeconomy. Coeﬃcients
on the measures of human capital show that income does indeed increase as a greater share
of household labor reaches higher education levels. The negative coeﬃcient on the number
of male and female laborers reﬂects the diminishing returns that set in as more family
members work the same set of plots. The positive coeﬃcients on measures of labor market
access show that greater village participation in oﬀ-farm labor markets is indeed associated
with higher incomes in the village.
Looking at the eﬀect of increasing market access across wealth terciles, it is immediately
obvious that village measures of oﬀ-farm employment reﬂect endogenous decisions within the
village. Wealthier households show a drop in income with increased access to migrant and
collective employment. This suggests that expanded participation in these labor markets
is driven in part by the negative shocks aﬀecting source communities. In addition, it is also
likely that the negative sign on collective employment is picking up the inverse relationship
between employment in private and collectively owned ﬁrms. As collective ﬁrms privatized
in the ’90s, labor employed in these ﬁrms essentially switches categories. The association of
growing access to private wage employment with income growth for more aﬄuent households
appears both strong and signiﬁcant.
In contrast, poorer households show an increase in income with greater access to both
collective and migrant wage employment. The result for collective employment reﬂects a
development strategy pursued by many villages in the late ’80s and early ’90s in which village
leaders borrowed money to set up local collective enterprises that would then hopefully raise
wages and revenues for the locality. In the wake of the credit crunch that hit China in the
early ’90s, many collectively owned enterprises either went bankrupt or “privatized” as ﬁrm
management responsibilities were contracted out to private managers (Chen, 1997).
As evident in Table 4, the strong likelihood that changes in oﬀ-farm market participation
are partially driven by community level shocks requires that we must control for these shocks
in order to identify the impact of market access on variability of income and consumption.
For this reason, the empirical strategy discussed below ﬁrst identiﬁes an idiosyncratic eﬀect
14of aggregate rainfall shocks while controlling for village-wide shock and measurement error.
Next it looks at the eﬀect of market access on how well households smooth the idiosyncratic
component of the shock on income.
3.2 Empirical Estimation of the Impact of Labor Market Development
on Shocks to Income
3.2.1 The Base Model
Households are assumed to earn proﬁts from agricultural production and any other house-
hold activities, πijt, and from labor income, wijtlijt, where wijt is the local wage rate and
lijt is household labor supplied to wage earning activities.11 Combining income from both
on-farm and oﬀ-farm activities, the income of household i from village j in period t will be
a function of household human capital, hijt, demographic characteristics of the household,
zijt,f a r ms i z e ,qijt, and the characteristics of the village and the local economy, rjt.
yijt (hijt,zijt,q ijt,rjt)=πijt (hijt,zijt,q ijt,rjt)+wijt (hijt,rjt)lijt (1)
Note that the wage income earned by household members will depend on household speciﬁc
human capital endowments and village characteristics. In order to avoid the selection issues
involved in the household’s complex choice from a range of oﬀ-farm activities, the analysis
below simply looks at the eﬀect of labor market access on the variability of household
income.12
Starting from an approach introduced by Paxson (1992), income can be decomposed
into permanent and transitory components, yP and yT, and an unexplained component,
yE.
yijt = yP (hijt,zijt,q ijt,rjt)+yT (sjt,δjt,q ijt · sjt)+yE (2)
11Labor supplied oﬀ-farm will be less than the households total labor endowment, Lijt ≥ lijt,w h e r et h e
labor endowment, Lijt, is a function of the household demographic characteristics, zijt.
12Input costs are not itemized and recorded separately in the RCRE dataset. It is assumed that prices
of seed, fertilizer and other inputs are constant within villages, and the eﬀect of these prices is then picked
up by village·year dummy variables.
15Permanent income is a function of household human capital (hijt), demographic (zijt)a n d
land characteristics (qijt) of the household, and also time-varying local village eﬀects. In




2zijt + β3qijt + gjt + uij + ²P
ijt (3)
where gjt are a set of village-time dummy variables picking up time-varying unobserved
village characteristics that aﬀect the household’s permanent income. These include such
factors as the village location and unmeasured factors as new roads and telecommunications
infrastructure, and unmeasured permanent changes in the local economy. Given that only
general information is available regarding the age structure of the household, it is also likely
that unobserved factors aﬀecting permanent income, uij, should be particularly worrisome




ijt, is represented as a function of rainfall shocks aﬀecting the
entire village (sjt), other economic shocks aﬀecting the villages (dj×t),a n du n i d e n t i ﬁed
shocks aﬀecting individual households, ²T
ijt. The dummy variables picking up all village-
wide shocks will be perfectly collinear with the rainfall shocks, so that the aggregate eﬀect
of rainfall shocks will not be independently identiﬁable. Assuming that households diﬀer
in their exposure to aggregate shocks, however, an idiosyncratic eﬀect of rainfall shocks can
be identiﬁed using interactions of household land area, qijt, and the shock, sjt.
yT
ijt = α1 (qijt · sjt)+dj×t + ²T
ijt (4)
Jacobi and Skouﬁas (1998) follow a similar procedure and use lagged farm characteristics
interacted with rainfall shocks. In this dataset, current household land holding is not likely
to vary with the rainfall shock for two reasons. First, rental or sale transactions in rural
China are still uncommon. Second, the household farm size measure in the RCRE data
reﬂect longer-term contractual rights over the land, and do not vary systematically with
annual rainfall shocks.13
13The variable used — the area of land under the household’s management (jiating jingying gengdi mianji)
— includes all land over which the household has longterm control rights.
16Neither transitory nor permanent components are observed explicitly, so (3) and (4) are
combined in (5) below. Note that the vector of village·time dummies, Vj×t, is now used to
pick up village-level events with an impact on both permanent and transitory components
of income and village-wide components of measurement error.14
yijt = β0
1hijt + β0
2zijt + β3qijt + α(qijt · sjt)+Vj×t + uij + ²ijt (5)
Keeping in mind the likelihood that unobserved household eﬀects will be of particular




2∆zijt + β3∆qijt + α∆(qijt · sjt)+Dj×t + εijt (6)
A new set of village·year dummy variables, Dj×t, now identify all village level inﬂuences
on the change in log income from year to year. The coeﬃcient α allows us to pick up the
idiosyncratic eﬀect of rainfall shocks on the variability of household income. The results
of this base speciﬁcation are shown in the ﬁrst columns of Tables 5 and 6 and discussed in
Section 3.3 below.
3.2.2 Identifying The Impact of Increased Access to Labor Markets
Eﬀorts to identify the impact of labor markets on household exposure to shocks must control
for possible endogeneity of measured access to markets. Village-wide access to outside labor
markets may be driven by the shocks themselves, by riskiness of the local environment, or
by common expectations about future developments in the community.15 As in (6) above,
village·year dummy variables may be used to control for the common eﬀects that have an
impact on village connection to outside markets. Introducing these common eﬀects makes it





assumed to be serially uncorrelated.
15The likelihood of this phenomenon is driven home in the regressions of change in log income per laborer
presented in Table 4. Wealthy and middle tercile households show a fall in income per laborer with increased
village participation oﬀ-farm. These regressions do not include village·time ﬁxed eﬀects, so it is likely that
the change in migrant or collective employment may partially reﬂect the eﬀects of a negative shock to the
local economy.
17impossible to identify the eﬀect of labor market access on the household’s ability to smooth
the aggregate eﬀect of the shock, but it is still possible to identify the impact of increased
employment opportunities by focussing on the idiosyncratic eﬀect of the shock. First, allow




2∆zijt + β3∆qijt + αjt∆(qijt · sjt)+Dj×t + εijt (60)
Next, let αjt be a function of village-wide access to oﬀ-farm labor markets, Ijt,s ot h a t
αjt = α(1 + Ijt) (7)
By introducing Ijt as a further interaction with ∆(qijt · sjt) we have
∆yijt = β0
1∆hijt + β0
2∆zijt + β3∆qijt + α1∆(qijt · sjt) (8)
+ α2 [It · ∆(qijt · sjt)] + Dj×t + εijt
These two interaction terms allow us to identify the eﬀect of growing access to local and
distant labor markets on the ability of households to cope with shocks to income.16 A
statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient α2 opposite in sign from α1 indicates that the eﬀect of
rainfall shocks on the variability of income is reduced with greater village access to the
16Using village level access to labor markets may appear blunt — it might seem preferable to separately
identify household level eﬀects of access to oﬀ-farm labor markets. Potential bias from unobserved house-
hold characteristics again arises in any eﬀort to split the sample based on past participation in oﬀ-farm
labor markets. If unobserved household eﬀects are correlated with past labor market experience, then
these unobserved characteristics may drive both lower observed variability of incomes and selection into
participation in oﬀ-farm activities. In this case, a conclusion that households with past access to oﬀ-farm
markets have less variable incomes would wrongly attribute the cause to labor market access rather than the
unobserved characteristic. Such characteristics might include factors aﬀecting household risk preferences
such as the presence of family members in distant cities or towns that can aid in ﬁnding jobs and supplying
additional sources of income in times of hardship, or some other characteristic that might improve prospects
for smoothing of agricultural shocks.
18oﬀ-farm labor market. While measures of village access to labor markets will also be
aﬀected by shocks to the local economy or by current assessments of the riskiness of agri-
cultural production, the village·year dummy variables control for these aggregate eﬀects.
The interaction terms allow identiﬁcation of the impact of connection to oﬀ-farm markets
controlling for the contemporaneous aggregate shock. Identiﬁcation is achieved by concen-
trating on the idiosyncratic eﬀect of the rainfall shock, and determining whether or not the
corresponding idiosyncratic eﬀect attenuates with increased village-wide access to oﬀ-farm
markets.
Use of these village level market access variables oﬀers an important beneﬁto v e ru s eo f
geographic variables.17 Locational variables are clearly exogenous, but they are not neces-
sarily an accurate reﬂection of connections between the village and outside labor markets.
O t h e rr e s e a r c ho nt e m p o r a r ym i g r a t i o ni nC h i n an o t e st h ei m p o r t a n tr o l eo fi n f o r m a t i o n
ﬂows between source and destination communities (Meng, 1996). Connections with outside
markets are not determined by geography alone, but through prior connection with poten-
tial employers outside the village. For this reason, connections to outside labor markets
picked up by alternative indices, Ijt, provide more information than geographic measures
alone.
3.3 Results: Access to Labor Markets and the Variability of Household
Income
Results of speciﬁcation (60) and diﬀerent implementations of (8) are shown in Tables 5 and
6. Interestingly, the eﬀect of access to oﬀ-farm labor markets is only strongly signiﬁcant
when the sample is split by the lagged wealth per capita tercile of the household (Table 6).
It is evident that households falling in the middle wealth tercile make the most use of both
migrant and local oﬀ-farm labor markets as a means of reducing income variability. More
aﬄuent households that are better able to insure consumption out of savings are less likely
17Other research attmpting to control for the remoteness of villages often uses geographic variables (see, for
example, Jalan and Ravallion, 1998). The RCRE village data contains both locational variables indicating
whether the village is situated in mountains, hills or on the plain, or in the outskirts of cities, and distance
of the village from main roads.
19to worry about smoothing the income eﬀect of production shocks. Poorer households, on
the other hand, may be poorer because they have less access to these labor markets due to
either a low human capital endowment, demographic constraints on ability to work outside
the village, geographic isolation, or poor information about jobs outside employment.
In addition, it is important to note that poorer households do not show signiﬁcant vari-
ability of income as a result of idiosyncratic eﬀects of the rainfall shock. This result may be
driven by two factors: ﬁrst, villages where less aﬄuent households are located may be more
homogenous in terms of the size of landholding, and this will mean that the idiosyncratic
component of shock identiﬁed oﬀ of land-holding is not likely to be signiﬁcant. Table 3
shows that the standard deviation of household landholding does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly
from the other two wealth terciles. A second possibility may be that these households take
ex ante precautions to limit exposure to changes in income prior to realization of rainfall
shocks. As emphasized by Morduch (1992, 1995), credit constrained households with little
ability to smooth consumption ex post may choose activities ex ante that limit exposure to
risk.
When interpreting these results, the magnitudes of identiﬁed shock are clearly not large.
For a household in the middle wealth tercile with average land area (6.92 mu) and average
i n c o m ep e rl a b o r e r( 8 3 6R M BY u a ni n1 9 9 7 ) ,t h ei d i o s y n c r a t i ce ﬀect of a two-standard
deviation positive rainfall shock is just a loss of 16 Yuan. By increasing access to oﬀ-farm
labor markets from zero to their average 1997 values, this shock is completely eliminated at
the average share of migrant labor market participation for this tercile in 1997. Evaluating
the eﬀect of collective employment at 1997 average share of labor in collective employment,
we ﬁnd no attenuation of the eﬀect of the shock. Finally, when local participants in private
wage employment increase to the 1997 average of 13 percent, the eﬀect of the shock drops
t o3Y u a nR M B .
These signiﬁcant, but relatively low magnitudes should be understood in light of the fact
that this procedure is only identifying the impact of oﬀ-farm opportunities on the idiosyn-
cratic eﬀect of the aggregate shock. Much of the eﬀe c to ft h es h o c kw i l lb ec o m m o na c r o s s
all households, but this common component and any average ability to smooth through the
20labor market is captured in the village·year dummy variables. Thus, the relatively small
signiﬁcant eﬀect need not be dismissed if the eﬀect of increased access to outside markets
is similar for the aggregate component of shock.
4 Consumption Variability and the Growth of Labor Mar-
kets
The most frequently employed test of how well households smooth consumption eﬀects of
income shocks uses the general framework of the full-insurance model laid out in Deaton
(1992, 1997), and the testing strategy follows the general spirit of Townsend (1994, 1995),
Cochrane(1991), Jalan and Ravallion (1997) and Gertler and Gruber (1997). This section
looks at how access to oﬀ-farm labor markets aﬀects household ability to smooth the eﬀect
of shocks on consumption. In a sense, the implementation of the model used here has
more of a risk-sharing ﬂavor typical of research on how well countries or regions within a
country share risk through participation in capital markets (see, for example, Atkeson and
Bayoumi, 1993). In rural China, access to capital markets is virtually non-existent, but the
opening of cross-regional labor markets oﬀer another means by which households can limit
exposure to shocks or reduce their impact ex post.
4.1 Access to Migrant Employment and Insurance Against Idiosyncratic
Shocks
The full-insurance model posits that while households in village communities lack access to
formal insurance and credit markets, they may still be able to insure each other against the
idiosyncratic shocks facing individual households. Opportunities for informal insurance
exist because information ﬂows within the village reduce the moral hazard and adverse
selection problems that make it diﬃcult for outside organizations to oﬀer insurance at an
aﬀordable price. Households within the village know who has made eﬀorts to reduce
exposure to risk, and know when shocks are legitimate. Because households within the
village are engaged in long-term relationships and have good information about one another,
21they are willing to eﬀe c t i v e l yt r a d ea c r o s ss t a t e so fn a t u r ee xa n t es oa st op r o v i d eo n e
another assistance in the case of hardship. If full insurance is available within a village, then
the marginal utilities of consumption of households within the village will move together.
Shocks to household consumption will track aggregate shocks experienced in the wider
village, and idiosyncratic shocks aﬀecting income of the household alone should have no
eﬀect on consumption Townsend (1994) and Deaton (1997).
Equation (9), below, shows the basic empirical relationship implied by the full insur-
ance model. Here, ∆cijt represents the change in the log of household i’s non-durable
consumption per capita between years t and t − 1, ∆¯ cjt is village j’s change in log average
consumption per capita, and ∆yijt is the log change in household income per capita. If
a household is able to perfectly smooth the eﬀects of idiosyncratic shocks to income, the
coeﬃcient on change in log household income, β1, should not be statistically diﬀerent from
zero, and the coeﬃcient on change in average village consumption, α1, should be one.
∆cijt = α1∆¯ cjt + β1∆yijt + εijt (9)
Chaudhuri and Ravallion (1997) have shown that coeﬃcients on this model are biased,
and that this bias can be corrected using village·year dummy variables to control for the
eﬀects of village level shocks. In addition, Jalan and Ravallion’s (1997) study of consump-
tion insurance in southwest China suggests that population size is endogenous and that this
fact should also be taken into consideration when implementing a full-insurance test, as in
(10) below.
∆cijt = Dv∗t + β1∆yijt + β2∆popijt + εijt (10)
Households conceivably smooth shocks to income by sending family members to live with
relatives outside of the village. Coeﬃcients on change in log household population should
be negative and signiﬁcant, reﬂecting the fact that changes in the household population will
have the eﬀect of reducing the shock to per capita consumption within the household.
Speciﬁcation (10) is typically estimated through instrumental variables methods in order
to control for both measurement error bias and the endogeneity of household size. First,
22as pointed out by Deaton (1997) and others, the fact that the household’s estimation of
both consumption and income includes home produced grains and vegetables, errors in the
valuation of income and consumption are likely to be correlated, and thus implying that
errors measurement of the dependent variable will be correlated with errors in measurement
of the change in log income. While one way of estimating (10) would be to follow Jalan and
Ravallion (1999) and instrument for both measurement error in income and endogeneity of
household size, it would be more direct to substitute the set of instruments directly for
change in log income.18 This approach makes sense because if one has an instrument for
shock other than the change in household’s self reported income. Given that it is possible to
directly estimate the aﬀect of a shock to agricultural production, concerns of measurement
error bias are also less important.
As an alternative, speciﬁcation (11) below uses the same regressors from Section 3 above
with change in the log of non-durable consumption as the dependent variable.
∆cijt = β0
1∆hijt + β0
2∆zijt + β3∆qijt + α1∆(qijt · sjt) (11)
+ α2 [It · ∆(qijt · sjt)] + Dj×t + εijt
As in Section 3.2, the eﬀect of village access to oﬀ-farm migrant and local labor markets is
picked up by introducing interactions of the rainfall shock and indices of market integration,
Ijt. Again, the village*year ﬁxed eﬀects allow us to control for growth or shock at the level
of the village.
4.2 Results — Opening of Labor Markets and Ability to Smooth Shocks
to Consumption
Tables 7 and 8 show that expanded participation in oﬀ-farm labor markets also facilitates
smoothing of consumption. Again, more aﬄuent households are better able to beneﬁt
from these opportunities, suggesting that some components of non-durable consumption
18As mentioned above, the household size variable in our analysis follows a legal deﬁnition and does not
change with shocks to income.
23among middle and upper tercile households are not absolute necessities. For middle tercile
households, moving from a position of no access to the 75th percentile FOR 1997 allows
households with average land holdings to completely smooth the idiosyncratic eﬀect of the
shock.
As in Section 3, the actual magnitude of shocks associated with the idiosyncratic eﬀect
a r eq u i t es m a l li nm a g n i t u d e . E v e ni ni s o l a t e da r e a sw i t hl o wl e v e l so fi n t e g r a t i o ni n
migrant or local labor markets, the average decline in consumption for households with
mean farm-size is only two percent with a two-standard-deviation positive rainfall shock.
Again, it is important to recognize that these speciﬁcations are only picking up the impact
o ft h ei d i o s y n c r a t i cc o m p o n e n to fs h o c k ,a n db o t ht h es i z eo ft h es h o c ka n dt h ei m p a c to f
access to markets will likely be more pronounced if the aggregate component could also be
separately identiﬁed.
The eﬀect of the shock may have serious implications if it results in shifts within house-
hold non-durable expenditures. For example, if shocks lead to reduced attendance in school
when the labor of children is required back on the farm, then exposure to shock can have
serious implications for investment in human capital. While the RCRE dataset lacks data
on school attendance, it does report expenditures related to education.19 Table 9 shows
the results of (11) with change in level of education expenditures per child as the depen-
dent variable. The results of these models show that the shock has a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on magnitudes of expenditure on education, and again, that participation in local labor
markets results in an attenuation of this eﬀect. If reduction of expenditures is correlated
with reduced time in school because households require more labor on farm subsequent
to the shock, then growth in local labor markets reduces the importance of this eﬀect on
investment in human capital. Increasing access to migrant employment is not associated
with a similar smoothing of shocks to education expenditures. This makes sense if having
family members outside the village at the time of the shock leads the household to rely
more strongly on children’s labor on farm.
19Education expenditures are not altogether satisfactory because reduced expenditure on books or supplies
is not likely to be as important as reduced attendance in class.
24While greater village access to migrant employment brings the beneﬁt of higher incomes
and improved ability to smooth consumption, the failure to smooth variation in expenditures
on education should be cause for concern. The opening of markets for migrant employment
works to reduce the growth in income disparity across regions of rural China, but the
possibility that education expenditures are no less variable with greater migrant employment
suggests that children in these regions may be still be at a disadvantage due to more year-
to-year variation in investment in human capital.
5 Conclusions
This paper shows that access to oﬀ-farm labor markets plays a potentially important role
in reducing the income and consumption variability associated with shocks to agricultural
production. The expansion of privately operated enterprises in some areas of rural China
is associated with both higher incomes, and greater ease of reducing the consumption and
income eﬀects of variable incomes. Greater access to the migrant employment opportunities
also oﬀers an important means of reducing income variability for some rural residents.
Results for rural residents in the poorest wealth tercile remain something of a puzzle
— neither consumption nor income showed much variability in response to rainfall shocks.
This observation could be driven by two factors. First, the analysis focussed on how well
households smoothed the idiosyncratic eﬀect of the aggregate rainfall shock. It is entirely
plausible that there was simply not much variability in the idiosyncratic eﬀect for poorer
households in the sample. This could be driven by either the ex ante risk-reducing eﬀorts
of more exposed households, or by more eﬃcient insurance among the households that are
most exposed. Second, these households are concentrated in villages where access to the
outside market has not increased as rapidly.
Attention to the potential risk-coping beneﬁts from oﬀ-farm employment is timely for
Chinese policymakers because both local and national policies accommodating the growth
of markets for oﬀ-farm migrant labor have come under increasing pressure over the last two
years. As cities face growing problems of unemployed workers from state-owned enterprises,
both local and national governments take measures to reduce competition for jobs between
25rural laborers and those urban residents left unemployed in the wake of state-owned en-
terprise (SOE) reform.20 The analysis of this paper suggests that rural residents would
suﬀer from urban policies restricting the in-ﬂow of migrants in two ways. Households send-
ing temporary migrants to cities will suﬀer both a loss of income, and a loss of insurance
against the income eﬀects of shocks on-farm. In fact, the analysis suggests that the welfare
of Chinese farm households in rural communities can be further improved by eliminating
the remaining institutional obstacles to expansion of migrant employment opportunities.
20Minutes of the Labor Mobility Forum, April and June 1998. The Labor Mobility Forum is a formal
discussion group of policy research staﬀ including representatives from the Development Research Center
of the State Council, the Ministry of Labor, and the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences.
266 Appendix — Rainfall Shocks and the Characterization of
Risk
In addition to the RCRE data, enumerators collected twenty years of monthly rainfall
data from weather stations near each village in order to characterize purely exogenous
shocks to the local agricultural economy. An eight-month rainfall shock was calculated
as the diﬀerence between realized and expected rainfall where it was assumed that farmers
may recognize a dry year or a wet year after observing rainfall in January and February.
Expected eight-month rainfall ˆ Xjt in village j of year t was calculated using twenty years
of monthly rainfall data for each of the 44 villages when running the regression:
Xjt = Dj + β1XFeb
jt + β2XJan
jt + εjt
This speciﬁcation allows some serial correlation between rainfall in the current eight-month
period, Xjt and rainfall observed in February and January, XFeb
jt and XJan
jt . Each of
the j regressions include a constant, Dj, to capture mean rainfall in the village. After
controlling for correlation in rainfall realizations over the year, the error term εjt is assumed
to be independently distributed. The rainfall shock in season s,i st h e nc a l c u l a t e da s
XS
jt = Xjst − ˆ Xjst. Calculating shocks in this way provides a better approximation of
surprise changes in rainfall than using the diﬀerence between actual and mean rainfall for
each season.21
21Shocks will appear larger, for example, if they are correlated over time but approximated as the
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Total Number of Villages 10 6 14 14
Near a City or County Seat 1021
Distance to Nearest 
     Public Road in 1993 (km)
          Nearest 1100
          Median 2.5 1 2 1.5
          Most Distant 6 1 8 15
Number of Villages on a Plain 3457
Number of Villages in a Hilly Area 2263
Number of Villages in a Mountainous Area 5034
Average Number of Households 305 314 353 383
Average Number of Households Surveyed 97 71 68 74
Average Village Population 1128 1111 1402 1623
Average Number of Prime Age Laborers* 545 626 764 859
1987
571 1078 690 574
307 644 442 359
6.7 12.3 8.5 6.8
1997
846 1322 869 814
432 847 566 462
28.5 103.8 42.3 39.1
Average Non-Durable Consumption Per 
Capita (in 1986 RMB Yuan)
Average Education Expenditures Per Child 
(in 1986 RMB Yuan)
*Prime age laborers are men between the ages of 15 and 60 and women between 15 and 55 who are 
working full time.  
Table 1
Summary Information on 44 RCRE Villages
Surveyed Annually Between 1986 and 1997
Province
Average Income Per Adult Laborer (in 1986 
RMB Yuan)
Average Non-Durable Consumption Per 
Capita (in 1986 RMB Yuan)
Average Education Expenditures Per Child 
(in 1986 RMB Yuan)
Average Income Per Adult Laborer (in 1986 
RMB Yuan)
 331987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997
Wealthiest Tercile
Household Size 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.1 4.1 3.9
Adult Laborers 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4
Income Per Laborer 830 853 771 920 1103 1204
Consumption Per Capita 470 486 466 518 657 657
Village Migrant Share 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.11
Village Collective Share 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.16
Village Private Wage Share 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.16 0.13 0.14
Middle Tercile
Household Size 4.7 4.7 4.5 4.4 4.2 4.2
Adult Laborers 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.6 2.6
Income Per Laborer 637 568 520 633 795 836
Consumption Per Capita 381 369 367 388 734 504
Village Migrant Share 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.12 0.14
Village Collective Share 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.09
Village Private Wage Share 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.13 0.13
Bottom Tercile
Household Size 4.7 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.1 4.1
Adult Laborers 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4
Income Per Laborer 462 429 388 487 599 623
Consumption Per Capita 324 315 300 342 423 407
Village Migrant Share 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.14 0.16 0.18
Village Collective Share 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.08
Village Private Wage Share 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.12 0.15 0.14
Village share measures are calculated from the RCRE village survey form.
Table 2
Summary Information by Wealth Tercile
 34Regressors Overall Wealthiest Tercile Middle Tercile Poorest Tercile
Male Prime Age Labor 1.305 1.269 1.362 1.297
(0.736) (0.750) (0.742) (0.706)
Female Prime Age Labor 1.152 1.141 1.2 1.118
(0.698) (0.678) (0.711) (0.709)
Dependents 1.832 1.776 1.838 1.902
(1.190) (1.165) (1.199) (1.210)
0.366 0.355 0.36 0.388
(0.338) (0.342) (0.330) (0.341)
0.32 0.335 0.331 0.287
(0.329) (0.340) (0.324) (0.315)
0.066 0.08 0.062 0.052
(0.185) (0.202) (0.177) (0.166)
0.103 0.134 0.092 0.073
(0.209) (0.235) (0.193) (0.177)
6.517 6.721 6.92 5.819
(5.110) (5.315) (5.084) (4.769)
Number of Plots  6.563 6.351 6.443 6.982
(4.712) (4.317) (4.629) (5.261)
Rainfall Shocks (100mm) 0.0534 0.011 0.087 0.153
(2.179) (2.065) (2.148) (2.355)
0.062 0.048 0.065 0.08
(0.087) (0.064) (0.087) (0.108)
0.093 0.125 0.085 0.057
(0.136) (0.167) (0.125) (0.076)
0.075 0.071 0.079 0.077
(0.094) (0.096) (0.095) (0.091)
Table 3
Household and Village Variables Used as Regressors
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses)
Share of Labor with 
Elementary Education
Share of Village Labor in 
Migrant Employment
Share of Village Labor in 
Local Collective 
Share of Village Labor in 
Local Private Enterprise
Share of Labor w/ Lower 
Middle School
Share of Labor w/ Upper 
Middle School
Share of Labor w/ Special 
Skill




Tercile Middle Tercile Poorest Tercile
∆=Male Laborers -0.0896 -0.1004 -0.0832 -0.0826
(0.0065) (0.0114) (0.0107) (0.0117)
∆=Female Laborers -0.1303 -0.1448 -0.1264 -0.1180
(0.0059) (0.0107) (0.0096) (0.0106)
∆=Dependents -0.0746 -0.0894 -0.0633 -0.0699
(0.0040) (0.0071) (0.0066) (0.0073)
0.0869 0.0293 0.0988 0.1126
(0.0153) (0.0293) (0.0260) (0.0249)
0.1071 0.0542 0.0825 0.1697
(0.0174) (0.0316) (0.0293) (0.0296)
0.1869 0.1719 0.1513 0.2108
(0.0275) (0.0454) (0.0464) (0.0527)
∆=Share of Labor with Special Skill 0.1323 0.1770 0.0705 0.1197
(0.0185) (0.0287) (0.0316) (0.0364)
0.0030 -0.0003 0.0057 0.0047
(0.0013) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0023)
0.0326 0.0363 0.0262 0.0337
(0.0018) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0037)
∆VMig -0.0101 -0.9878 -0.0970 0.4291
(0.0639) (0.1289) (0.1071) (0.0987)
∆VColl 0.4022 -0.0185 0.1941 0.6707
(0.0996) (0.1589) (0.1727) (0.1582)
∆VPriv 0.1600 0.1303 0.1170 0.0649
(0.0484) (0.0657) (0.0854) (0.0942)
∆ Eight-Month Rainfall Shock -0.0031 -0.0045 -0.0056 0.0027
(0.0017) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0024)
∆ (Eight-Month Rainfall Shock)
2 -0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0013 -0.0017
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004)
R
2 0.1134 0.1194 0.1194 0.1194
Observations 26659 26659 26659 26659
Note:  The specification includes village and province*year dummy variables that are jointly significant.
Table 4
The Impact of Aggregate Rainfall Shocks, and Access to 
Off-Farm Labor Markets on Household Income
Dependent Variable:  ∆=(log Income/Laborer)
∆=Number of Plots Managed by 
Household
∆=Area of Land Managed By the 
Household
(Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses)
∆=Share of Labor with Elementary 
Education
∆=Share of Labor with Lower Middle 
School Education
∆=Share of Labor with Upper Middle 
School Education
 36Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆=Male Laborers -0.0874 -0.0874 -0.0873 -0.0873 -0.0873
(0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0062)
∆=Female Laborers -0.1281 -0.1281 -0.1281 -0.1281 -0.1281
(0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056)
∆=Dependents -0.0733 -0.0734 -0.0733 -0.0733 -0.0733
(0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038)
0.0915 0.0916 0.0915 0.0916 0.0915
(0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0146)
0.1058 0.1058 0.1058 0.1060 0.1059
(0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0165)
0.1886 0.1887 0.1887 0.1890 0.1889
(0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0260)
0.1516 0.1517 0.1513 0.1515 0.1512
(0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0179)
0.0035 0.0035 0.0035 0.0035 0.0035
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
0.0328 0.0328 0.0328 0.0328 0.0328
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
-0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0011










2 0.2217 0.2218 0.2228 0.2228 0.2228
Observations 26659 26659 26659 26659 26659
Notes:  Male and female laborers and dependents are long-term members of the household.  The land managed by the household is land contracted 
to the household over the long-term and does not vary with shocks.  Not shown but jointly significant are village*time dummy variables.
Table 5
Village Access to Off-Farm Labor Markets
and the Variability of Household Income
Dependent Variable:  ∆=(log Income/Laborer)
(Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses)
∆=Share of Labor with Elementary 
Education
∆=Share of Labor with Lower Middle 
School Education
∆=Share of Labor with Upper Middle 
School Education
∆=Share of Labor with Special Skill
[∆(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]*VColl t
[∆(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]*VPrivt
[∆(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]*VLoc t
∆=Number of Plots Managed by 
Household
∆=Area of Land Managed By the 
Household
∆=[(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]
[∆(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]*VMigt
 37Regressor High Medium Low
-0.0010 -0.0006 0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005)
F-Test (Coefficients on (1) Equal ?) 3.74
F-Prob 0.0238





F-Test (Coefficients on (1) Equal ?) 8.2
F-Prob 0.0003
F-Test (Coefficients on (2) Equal ?) 5.71
F-Prob 0.0033





F-Test (Coefficients on (1) Equal ?) 5.19
F-Prob 0.0056
F-Test (Coefficients on (2) Equal ?) 1.62
F-Prob 0.1973
Tables 6.1 - 6.5
Village Access to Off-Farm Labor Markets
and the Variability of Household Income
By Household Wealth
6.1 Base Regression
Lagged Household Wealth Tercile
(1)=∆=[(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]
6.2 Village Access to Migrant Markets
Lagged Household Wealth Tercile
(1)==∆=[(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]
(2)==[∆(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]*VMigt
6.3 Village Access to Local Wage Employment in Collective Enterprises
Lagged Household Wealth Tercile
(1)==∆=[(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]
(2)==[∆(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]*VCollt
Specifications 6.1-6.5 run the same specifications as in Table 5, but the entire sample is split.  The only 
coefficients shown are those related to the idiosyncratic effect of the rainfall shock.





F-Test (Coefficients on (1) Equal ?) 4.84
F-Prob 0.0079
F-Test (Coefficients on (2) Equal ?) 2.16
F-Prob 0.1154





F-Test (Coefficients on (1) Equal ?) 5.94
F-Prob 0.0026
F-Test (Coefficients on (2) Equal ?) 2.83
F-Prob 0.0588
Specifications 6.1-6.5 run the same specifications as in Table 5, but the entire sample is split.  The only 
coefficients shown are those related to the idiosyncratic effect of the rainfall shock.
Tables 6.4 - 6.5
6.4 Village Access to Local Wage Employment in Private Enterprises
Lagged Household Wealth Tercile
(1)==∆=[(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]
[∆(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]*VLoct
(2)==[∆(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]*VPrivt
6.5 Village Access to Local Wage Employment
Lagged Household Wealth Tercile
∆=[(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]
 39Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆=Male Laborers -0.1286 -0.1285 -0.1285 -0.1284
(0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045)
∆=Female Laborers -0.1123 -0.1124 -0.1123 -0.1124
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041)
∆=Dependents -0.0496 -0.0493 -0.0493 -0.0493
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028)
0.0633 0.0629 0.0632 0.0630
(0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0107)
0.0479 0.0478 0.0480 0.0480
(0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0120)
0.1019 0.1018 0.1020 0.1021
(0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0190) (0.0190)
0.0640 0.0633 0.0636 0.0632
(0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0130)
0.0200 0.0198 0.0199 0.0199
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
-0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0009










2 0.1897 0.1895 0.1894 0.1896
Observations 26733 26733 26733 26733
Notes:  Male and female laborers and dependents are long-term members of the household.  The land managed by the household 
is land contracted to the household over the long-term and does not vary with shocks.  Not shown but jointly significant are 
village*time dummy variables.
Table 7
Village Access to Off-Farm Labor Markets
and the Variability of Non-Durable Consumption
Dependent Variable: ∆ (log Non-Durable Consumption Per Capita)
(Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses)
∆=Share of Labor with Elementary 
Education
∆=Share of Labor with Lower Middle 
School Education
∆=Share of Labor with Upper Middle 
School Education
[∆(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]*VCollt
[∆(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]*VPrivt
[∆(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]*VLoct
∆=Share of Labor with Special Skill
∆=Area of Land Managed By the 
Household
∆=[(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]
[∆(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]*VMigt
 40Regressor High Medium Low
-0.0004 -0.0001 0.0000
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0000)
F-Test (Coefficients on (1) Equal ?) 3.15
F-Prob 0.0428





F-Test (Coefficients on (1) Equal ?) 1.26
F-Prob 0.2833
F-Test (Coefficients on (1) Equal ?) 0.86
F-Prob 0.4214





F-Test (Coefficients on (1) Equal ?) 2.97
F-Prob 0.0515
F-Test (Coefficients on (1) Equal ?) 0.1
F-Prob 0.9093
Tables 8.1 -8.5
Village Access to Off-Farm Labor Markets
and the Variability of Non-Durable Consumption
By Lagged Household Wealth Tercile
8.1 Base Regression
Lagged Household Wealth Tercile
(1)=∆=[(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]
8.2 Village Access to Migrant Markets
Lagged Household Wealth Tercile
(1)==∆=[(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]
(2)==[∆(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]*VMigt
8.3 Village Access to Local Wage Employment in Collective Enterprises
Lagged Household Wealth Tercile
(1)==∆=[(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]
(2)==[∆(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]*VCollt
Specifications 8.1-8.5 run the same specifications as in Table 7, but the entire sample is split.  The only 
coefficients shown are those related to the idiosyncratic effect of the rainfall shock.





F-Test (Coefficients on (1) Equal ?) 2.2
F-Prob 0.1105
F-Test (Coefficients on (1) Equal ?) 0.9
F-Prob 0.4075





F-Test (Coefficients on (1) Equal ?) 2.45
F-Prob 0.0867
F-Test (Coefficients on (1) Equal ?) 0.27
F-Prob 0.7612
Specifications 8.1-8.5 run the same specifications as in Table 7, but the entire sample is split.  The 
only coefficients shown are those related to the idiosyncratic effect of the rainfall shock.
Tables 8.4-8.5
8.4 Village Access to Local Wage Employment in Private Enterprises
Lagged Household Wealth Tercile
(1)==∆=[(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]
[∆(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]*VLoct
(2)==[∆(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]*VPrivt
8.5 Village Access to Local Wage Employment
Lagged Household Wealth Tercile
∆=[(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]
 42Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆=Male Laborers 2.76 2.76 2.80 2.80 2.83
(2.94) (2.94) (2.94) (2.94) (2.94)
∆=Female Laborers 4.52 4.53 4.48 4.51 4.47
(2.65) (2.65) (2.65) (2.65) (2.65)
∆=Dependents -27.81 -27.82 -27.79 -27.79 -27.78
(1.93) (1.93) (1.93) (1.93) (1.93)
17.89 17.89 17.80 17.88 17.80
(6.73) (6.73) (6.73) (6.73) (6.73)
2.02 2.00 2.09 2.06 2.11
(7.48) (7.48) (7.48) (7.48) (7.48)
0.22 0.23 0.36 0.33 0.43
(11.32) (11.32) (11.32) (11.32) (11.32)
13.13 13.15 12.90 13.07 12.87
(7.84) (7.84) (7.84) (7.84) (7.84)
2.50 2.50 2.48 2.50 2.48
(0.74) (0.74) (0.74) (0.74) (0.74)
-0.30 -0.34 -0.50 -0.46 -0.60










2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Observations 21814 21814 21814 21814 21814
Village*Year dummy variables are jointly statistically significant, but not shown.
Table 9
Village Access to Off-Farm Labor Markets
and the Impact of Rainfall Shocks on Education Expenditures
Dependent Variable:  ∆=(Education Expenditures Per Dependent)
∆=Share of Labor with Elementary 
Education
∆=Share of Labor with Lower Middle 
School Education
∆=Share of Labor with Upper Middle 
School Education
∆=Share of Labor with Special Skill
[∆(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]*VPrivt
[∆(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]*VLoc t
∆=Area of Land Managed By the 
Household
∆=[(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]
[∆(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]*VMigt
[∆(Area of Land Managed By the 
Household)*(Rainfall Shock)]*VColl t
 44